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FOR REFORM UTILIZING THE
DISCOVERY RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
A child at the age of nine had been sexually abused two to three
times a week by her stepfather. Because of her stepfather's threats
of further abuse and her mother's disregard for the criminal, sexual
activities, the child was prevented from disclosing the wrongful acts
to others. Her natural father became aware of the criminal, sexual
acts against his daughter only after the child attempted suicide. By
that time, it was too late. The stepfather escaped prosecution be-
cause the statute of limitations had expired, barring the state from
commencing the criminal proceedings.'
The above scenerio is a repeated occurence in today's society.
Child sexual abuse2 itself is a societal injustice which has long
plagued our nation. Recently, this crisis has gained the attention of
legislatures throughout the country. Since the early 1980s, a
number of states have undertaken statutory reform efforts to im-
prove the handling of child sexual abuse cases in the legal system.3
This recent proliferation of legislation is predominantly directed at
the procedures utilized in criminal prosecution of child abuse of-
fenders. Some of these reforms include the adoption of hearsay ex-
ceptions for the child's out-of-court statements of abuse, the
removal of competency tests for child witnesses, the giving of testi-
mony through videotape or closed circuit television, and the use of
I These facts are taken from State v. Danielski, 348 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984). In Danielski, the district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it
was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 352. However, the appellate court, recog-
nizing the injustice created an implied exception to toll the statutory period. Id. at 357.
2 For purposes of this comment, the term "child sexual abuse" refers to any sexual
contact ranging from fondling to intercourse with a minor.
3 Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and Other Emerging Legal
Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REv. 645 (1985) (suggests that the recent
reform movement in child abuse matters is the result of a greater awareness of child
sexual abuse and an increase in the number of reported incidents of abuse).
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dosed courtrooms during the child's testimony.4
Other legislative innovations concerning child sexual abuse in-
clude a statutory requirement of reporting abuse. For example, in
North Carolina5 any person or institution who has cause to suspect
that any juvenile is abused or neglected is required to report such
cases. Statutes requiring that abuse be reported specify that upon
receipt of such reports the social service division must immediately
inform the appropriate law enforcement agency. 6 Many states im-
pose criminal sanctions or fines upon those professionals who fail to
report possible cases of child abuse.7 Further, the states of Ohio8
and Utah9 have mandated that sex offenders register their wherea-
bouts with local and state officials. 10
Despite these measures, prosecuting cases of child victimization
remains difficult. This difficulty arises from the fact that many of
these cases go unreported for years. Because children are often
very young, confused, and feel responsible for the acts, they are
afraid to report the assaults or may not even realize that what hap-
pened to them is a crime. This is especially true in incest cases, but
it also occurs in cases involving molestation by nonfamily members.
As a result, many cases of child sexual abuse cannot be prosecuted
simply because the child did not report the abuse until years later,
after the statute of limitations had expired."
Faced with this awareness of the difficulties associated with the
statute of limitations in prosecuting child sexual abuse offenses,
many state legislatures have amended applicable legislation by the
implementation of new exceptions to toll the running of the limita-
tions period and by extending the period during which prosecution
may be commenced. This Comment analyzes the procedures and
exceptions to the statutes of limitations adopted in each state. It
then endorses a procedure that grants discretion to the courts to toll
the limitation period until discovery of the offense is made. This
procedure takes into consideration the purposes of a statute of limi-
tations as well as the circumstances common in child sexual abuse
4 See Comment, The Young Victim as Witness for the Prosecution: Another Form of Abuse?,
89 DicK. L. REV. 721 (1985).
5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-543 (1986).
6 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2102(a) (1989).
7 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING AND EXPLOITED CHILDREN, SELECTED STATE
LEGISLATION: A GUIDE FOR EFFECTIVE STATE LAWS TO PROTECT CHILDREN (Jan. 1985)
[hereinafter GUIDE].
8 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.02 (Baldwin 1986).
9 UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-512 (1989).
10 See GUIDE, supra note 7, at 18.
11 Id. at 17.
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offenses. Through the reformed exception, justice can be served
against child sexual abusers who in the past were able to utilize stat-
utes of limitations to their benefit.
II. SURVEY OF THE STATE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS FOR CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE OFFENSES
State legislatures, recognizing the social harm eminating from
child abuse, have enacted legislation providing criminal sanctions
against child abuse offenders.' 2 However, to a certain degree, the
effectiveness of any criminal legislation is determined by the en-
forceability of the laws against child abuse. In most states enforce-
ability is limited by another provision, generally entitled "limitation
of prosecution." A limitation of prosecution provision, or a statute
of limitations, limits the enforcement of criminal legislation by limit-
ing the period of time in which a prosecutor can bring the case to
court. Thus, upon the expiration of the statutory limitation period,
the state is prevented from prosecuting an alleged offender.
The limitation period for sexual offenses committed against
children is predominantly prescribed by statute. Statutes of limita-
tions are typically divided into subprovisions based upon the grade
of the offense. Each gradation is provided with a specific time pe-
12 See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.434 (1962 & Supp. 1988);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405(8) (1978 & Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-14-108
(1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-405 (1986);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-7 0 (West 1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. I I § 768 (1978); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-3501 (1981); FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (1976 & Supp. 1989); GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-2019 (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-736 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 18-1506
(1987 & Supp. 1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-15 (1979 & Supp. 1989); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-4 (West 1986); IOWA CODE § 709.3 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
3503 (1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.110 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1987); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:80 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 254 (1964 & Supp.
1989); MD. CRIM. LAW CODE ANN. § 27-464A (1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265,
§ 24B (Law. Co-op. 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520(b) (West 1968 & Supp.
1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342 (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-21 (1972 &
Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.100 (Vernon 1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-625
(1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-320,01 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.366(2)(c) (1986);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632A:2 (1986 & Supp. 1988); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4 (West
1982 & Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-13 (1983); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 130 (McKin-
ney 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-03 (1985 &
Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04 (Baldwin 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 1123 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.415 (1971 & Supp. 1987); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 3122 (Purdon 1981); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-8 (1961 & Supp.
1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-
22-7 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-600 (1982 & Supp. 1987); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.11 (Vernon 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404.1 (1978 & Supp. 1989); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 2602 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-370 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.083 (1983 & Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE § 61-8D-5 (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 948.02 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-300 (1977 & Supp. 1988).
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iod during which commencement of prosecution against an offense
of that grade may take place. For example, Hawaii's statute of limi-
tations provides:
Time Limitations.
(1) A prosecution for murder may be commenced at any time.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecution for
other offenses are subject to the following periods of limitation:
(a) A prosecution for a class A felony must be-commenced
within six years after it is committed;
(b) A prosecution for any other felony must be com-
menced within three years after it is committed;
(c) A prosecution for a misdemeanor or a parking violation
must be commenced within two years after it is committed;
(d) A prosecution for a petty misdemeanor or a violation
other than a parking violation must be commenced within one
year after it is committed.' 3
The applicable limitation period for a child sexual abuse offense 14 in
Hawaii would be three years. However, not every state's statute of
limitations provision is this simple.
State legislatures have created a wide range of statutory limita-
tion periods. Nationally, there is no consensus of an ideal limitation
period or applicable exceptions. State statutes of liiitations vary in
the number of years, the time at which the limitation period com-
mences, and exceptions which toll the limitation period. This Com-
ment will first examine states with the simplest legislation and then
proceed to the states with more complex statutes of limitations.
States with similar legislation are categorized under general head-
ings and analyzed accordingly.
A. NO STATUTORY PERIOD
Not all states have a specified statute of limitations period appli-
cable to child sexual abuse offenses. In Alambama, 15 Kentucky, 16
and Rhode Island' 7 there is no statute of limitations for felonies.
13 HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-108 (1985).
14 In Hawaii a child sexual abuse offense is a class C felony. See HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 707-736(2) (1985). Likewise, the majority of the states classify sexual abuse of chil-
dren as a felony. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
15 ALA. CODE § 15-3-5 (1975) states in pertinent part: "Offenses having no limita-
tions. (a) Prosecution may commence at any time for... (4) Any sex offense involving a
victim under sixteen years of age, regardless of whether it involves force or serious in-
jury or death."
16 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.050(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) states in pertinent
part: "Except as otherwise expressly provided, the prosecution of a felony is not subject
to a period of limitation and may be commenced at any time."
17 R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-12-17(1) (1956 & Supp. 1988) states in pertinent part: "Stat-
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Accordingly, prosecution may be commenced at any time for feloni-
ous child sexual abuse offenses in these three states.
Likewise in North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming, the state legislatures have remained silent with
regard to any applicable statutory period of limitations.' 8 There-
fore, it is implied that prosecution may commence at any time.' 9
The underlying rationale for not providing a bar to prosecution of
certain felonies is that the interest of the state in prosecuting those
crimes outweighs the benefits derived from the implementation of a
limitation period.20
B. GENERAL STATUTORY PERIOD FOR FELONIES
Several states have enacted a specified statutory limitation pe-
riod for felonies in general. In these states, the limitation period for
sexual offenses committed against children is defined within the
general statutes of limitations for felonies.2 1 Generally, the period
for felony statutes of limitations range between two and fifteen
years.2 2 These variations arise because states assign different
weights to factors influencing a longer or shorter period of limita-
tion: each state balances those interests supporting a longer period
of limitations against those interests justifying a shorter period of
ute of Limitations. (a) There shall be no statute of limitations for the following offenses
... first degree child molestation sexual assualt ...."
18 In North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-1 (1983), Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
8 (1989) and West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 61-1 1-9 (1989), the statutory limitation pro-
visions apply to prosecutions of misdemeanors only and not felonies. The penal code
sections of the South Carolina and Wyoming statutes, however, do not have statutes of
limitations.
19 Note, The Statute of Limitations in Criminal Law: A Penetrable Barrier to Prosecution, 102
U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1954) (where a statute limiting the time period for prosecution is
absent, a criminal act may be prosecuted at any time after its commission).
20 Reed v. Commonwealth, 738 S.W.2d 818, 819-20 (Ky. 1987). The indictment
charged that upon five occasions, defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with his ne-
ice, a female under fourteen years of age, by forcible compulsion. Defendant contended
that he was prejudiced by a delay of eight years in the bringing of charges against him.
The court, however, held that under Kentucky statutes there is no time bar for com-
mencement of prosecution when the offense is classified as a felony.
21 See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 8(2)(B) (1983), NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-110
(1985), OR. REV. STAT. § 131.125 (1987) (three years); HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-108(2)
(1986) (a class A felony is six years, any other felony is three years); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 30.10(2)(b) (McKinney 1981) (five years); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 572(1)
(West 1981 & Supp. 1989), OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.13 (Anderson 1983), Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 939.74(1) (West 1982) (six years); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-1-5 (1989), S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-42-2 (1988) (seven years); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-8 (1978
& Supp. 1984) (a first degree felony is 15 years, a second degree felony is six years and a
third degree felony is five years).
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limitations. For instance, both Hawaii23 and New Mexico 24 provide
a longer limitation period for a more serious offense and a shorter
limitation period for a lesser offense. Under New Mexico's statute
of limitations, 25 sexual penetration involving a child under thirteen
years of age is a felony of the first degree, 26 which has a limitation
period of fifteen years. Where the victim is between the age of thir-
teen and sixteen, the same conduct is a second degree felony,27 and
the period of limitation is reduced to six years. Finally, if only sex-
ual contact occurs with a minor, it is a third degree felony28 and thus
subject to a three year limitation period.
In addition to the general specified periods of limitation for
felonies, many state legislatures have provided specific time periods
for offenses committed against minors. The Georgia2 9 and Idaho
3 °
legislatures have provided for a longer period-of limitation when an
offense has been committed against a minor. North Dakota3 and
Pennslyvania 32 have also recognized the special need for a longer
23 HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-108(2) (1985). "For the most serious class of felonies,
other than murder, a six year period is set, while for the other classes of felonies, three
years is deemed sufficient." Commentary on HAw. REv. STAT. § 701-108(2) (1985).
24 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-1-8 (1978 & Supp. 1984) states in pertinent part:
No person shall hereafter be prosecuted, tried or punished' in any court of this state
unless the indictment shall be found or information or complaint filed therefore
within the time hereinafter provided:
A. for a capital felony, within fifteen years from the time the crime was commit-
ted;
B. for a first degree felony, within fifteen years from the time the crime was
committed;
C. for a second degree felony, within six years from the time the crime was
committed;
D. for a third or fourth degree felony, within five years from the time the crime
was committed ....
25 Id.
26 Id. at § 30-9-11(A)(1).
27 Id. at § 30-9-11(B)(1).
28 Id. At § 30-9-13(A).
29 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-503 (Harrison 1988) states in pertinent part:
Limitation of criminal prosecution, generally... (c) Prosecution for felonies ...
must be commenced within four years after the commission of the crime, provided
that prosecution for felonies committed against victims who are at the time of the
commission of the offense under the age of fourteen years must be commenced
within seven years after the commission of the crime.
30 IDAHO CODE § 19-402 (1985) states in pertinent part: "Commencement of prose-
cutions for crimes against children and other felonies. A prosecution for.., any felony
committed upon or against a minor child must be commenced within five years after the
commission of the offense ......
31 N.D. CENr. CODE § 29-04-03.2 (1974 & Supp. 1989) states in pertinent part:
"Statute of limitations as to child victim. If the victim.., is under the age of fifteen, the
applicable period of limitation, if any, does not begin to run until the victim has reached
the age of fifteen."




limitation period for crimes committed against children and thus
have enacted an exception applicable under such circumstances
which tolls the running of the applicable limitations period for a
specified number of years when the offense is committed against a
minor.
C. SPECIFIED STATUTES OF LIMITATION FOR CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
Even a greater number of states have enacted specific legisla-
tion for limitation of prosecution for sexual offenses involving mi-
nor victims. 3 3 An examination of these statutes indicates how the
legislature of individual states evaluate the various factors that de-
termine the limitation period for child sexual abuse offenses.
Several states, in enacting a limitation period for sexual abuse
offenses committed against minors, have simply specified a certain
number of years in which prosecution against the alleged offender
may be commenced. The specified number of years represents how
each state legislature defines the ideal time period. This period
takes into consideration factors of stale evidence, motivation for
prosecution, and repose, and measures these factors against the
state's desire for retribution, concealment of the wrongful acts, and
the seriousness of the crime.34 The range in the length of the statu-
tory limitation periods illustrates the different mode of evaluation of
the individual factors utilized by the different state legislatures.
Iowa35 and Tennessee36 have the shortest limitation period,
Tolling of statute. Except as provided by section 5553(e) ... the period of limitation
does not run during any time when ... (3) a child is under eighteen years of age,
where the crime involves injuries to the person of the child caused by the wrongful
act, or neglect, or unlawful violence, or negligence of the child's parents or by a
person responsible for the child's welfare, or any individual residing in the same
home as the child, or a paramour of the child's parent.
33 See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 12.10.020 (1962 & Supp. 1989) which states in part:
Specific Time Limitation . . . (c) Even if the general time limitation has expired, a
prosecution under A.S. § 11.41.410 - 11.41.460 [sexual offenses] ... for an offense
committed against a person under the age of sixteen may be commenced within one
year after the crime is reported to a peace officer or the person reaches the age of
sixteen, whichever occurs first. This subsection does not extend the period of limi-
tation by more than five years.
34 Uelmen, Making Sense Out of the California Criminal Statute of Limitations, 15 PAC. LJ.
35 (1983) (examines the factors for and against a longer or shorter period of limitations
for various crimes and then compares these factors to current California law).
35 IowA CODE ANN. § 802.2 (West 1976 & Supp. 1989) states in pertinent part: "Sex-
ual abuse of child. An information or indictment for sexual abuse in the first, second or
third degree committed on or with a child under the age of ten years shall be found
within four years after its commission."
36 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2-101(c) (1977 & Supp. 1989) states in pertinent part:
"Prosecution for any offense committed against a child that constitutes a criminal of-
fense under the provisions of... [sexual offense listed] ... shall be commenced no later
848 [Vol. 80
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four years, while Massachusetts 37, Missouri,38 and Texas39 have the
longest limitation period, ten years. The remaining eight states
40
have enacted limitation periods which fall within these two ex-
tremes. Three of these states have determined that the optimal limi-
tation period for child sexual abuse offenses is five years.
4 1
Colorado also has a specific statute of limitations provision for
the offense of sexual assault on a child. In Colorado the general
limitation period of three years is extended to ten years when the
offense is one of child sexual abuse.
42
D. TOLLING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
An alternative approach to extending the limitation period is to
provide exceptions to the prevailing general provisions when the of-
than the date the child attains the age of majority or within four (4) years next after the
commission of the offense, whichever occurs later ...."
37 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 277, § 63 (Law Co-op 1980 & Supp. 1988) states, "An indict-
ment for a crime set forth in sections ... [sex offenses] ... may be found and filed within
ten years of the date of commission of said crime."
38 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 556.037 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1989) states that "prosecutions
for unlawful sexual offenses involving a person seventeen years of age or under must be
commenced within ten years after commission of the offense if the offense charged is a
felony and within five years after commission of the offense if the offense is a
misdemeanor."
39 TEx. GRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12.01(2)(d) (Vernon 1965 & Supp. 1989) (provides
that prosecution for child sexual abuse offense must be commenced within 10 years
from the date of the commission of the offense).
40 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3106(2) (1969 & Supp. 1987), MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-1-
205(1)(b) (1989) (provides a five year limitation period during which commencement of
prosecution is permitted where the victim was under 18 years of age at the time the
offense was committed.); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5552(b) (Purdon 1981 & Supp. 1989)
(provides a five year limitations period); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767.24(2) (West
1982 & Supp. 1989) (provides that prosecution may commence up until six years after
the commission of the offense or until the victim reaches 21 years of age, whichever is
later); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 113, § 450 1(c) (1974 & Supp. 1989) (provides a six years pe-
riod of limitation if victim is under 16 years of age at the time of offense); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 628.26(c) (West 1983 & Supp. 1989) (provides a limitation period of seven
years); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-04-03.1 (1974 & Supp. 1989) (provides that prosecution
may be commenced within seven years where victim is under 18 years of age); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.04.080(1)(c) (1988 & Supp. 1989) (provides a seven year period of
limitation).
41 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3106(2) (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-1-205(1)(b)
(1989); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5552(b) (Purdon 1981 & Supp. 1989).
42 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-401(7) (1984 & Supp. 1988) states:
When the victim at the time of the commission of the offense is a child under fifteen
years of age, the period of time during which a person may be prosecuted shall be
extended for an additional seven years as to a felony charged under section 18-3-
404 ....
The intent of the general assembly in enacting enacting § 16-5-401 (6) and
(7) in 1982 was to create a ten year statute of limitations as to offenses specified in
said subsections committed on or afterJuly 1, 1979.
1989] 849
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fense is one of child sexual abuse. These exceptions toll the appli-
cable time period defined in the general provisions until the victim
attains majority (or soon thereafter)43 or until discovery of the
wrongful act is made by a guardian or law enforcement agency.44 A
few states have utilized both types of tolling provisions, with the ap-
plicable period being the shortest of the two periods. 45 However,
states which permit tolling the statutory period preserve a maximum
time period during which prosecution must commence.
46
1. Attaining Majority
For crimes involving minors and, in particular, child sexual
abuse offenses, several state legislatures have extended the statutory
period of limitations until the victim attains majority.47 Generally,
the limitation period provided by this exception will not be shorter
than the general limitation period; otherwise, the latter provision
applies.48
A few states49 have taken this exception one step further and
43 See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
45 See ALASKA STAT. § 12.10.020(c) (1962 & Supp. 1989) (permits commencement of
prosecution for a sexual offense committed against a minor, even though the general
time limitation has expired, until one year after the victim reaches the age of 16 or the
violation is reported to a peace officer, whichever occurs first); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 277,
§ 63 (Law. Co-op. 1980 & Supp. 1989) (provides that if the victim is under 16 years of
age at the time of the commission of the offense, the limitation period is tolled until the
victim reaches 16 years of age or until it is reported to a law enforcement agency, which-
ever occurs first); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.095(2) (1986 & Supp. 1987) (prosecution
may be commenced any time until the victim is 18 years old or until reported to the
appropriate authority, whichever is earlier).
46 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.10.020(c) (1962 & Supp. 1989) states, "This subsection
does not extend the period of limitation by more than five years."
47 See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 767.24(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989) (permits com-
mencement of prosecution within six years from the date of the commission of the crime
or by the victim's twenty-first birthday, whichever is later); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 171.095(2) (1986 & Supp. 1987) (permits prosecution of the offense until the victim is
18 years old if not previously reported); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-6(b)(4) (West 1982 &
Supp. 1989) (permits commencement of prosecution until two years after the victim
attains eighteen years of age or within five years from the date of the commission of the
crime, whichever occurs later); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2-101(c) (1982 & Supp. 1989)
(permits commencement of prosecution at any time until the victim attains majority or
within four years).
48 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-6(d) (Smith-Hurd 1989) which states:
When the victim is under eighteen years of age, a prosecution for criminal sexual
assualt... may be commenced within one year of the victim attaining the age of
eighteen years. However, in no such case shall the time period for prosecution ex-
pire sooner than three years after the commission of the offense.
49 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-109(h) (1987) states in pertinent part:
If the period prescribed in subsection (b) [three years] has expired, a prosecution
may nevertheless be commenced for violations of the following offenses if, when the
alleged violation occurred, the offense was committed against a minor, the violation
850 [Vol. 80
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have tolled application of the statutory period until the victim at-
tains majority. Thus, the applicable statutory period does not begin
to run until the victim becomes of age.
2. Discovery
a. In General
Statutes of limitations may also be tolled until discovery of the
alleged offense is made by the victim or a law enforcement agency.
This exception is based upon the common law "discovery rule"
principle.50
Ordinarily, a statute of limitations begins to run "upon the oc-
curence of the last fact essential to the cause of action."51 However,
in jurisdictions in which the discovery rule is applicable, courts have
held that the limitation period does not begin to run until the plain-
tiff discovered or in the exercise of diligence should have discovered
all of the facts essential to the cause of action.52
The underlying rationale of the discovery rule focuses on the
inequity in foreclosing a cause of action where the victim may not
know of the injury or harm. 53 The interests of the defendant, on the
other hand, are protected by employing a balancing test to deter-
mine the applicability of the discovery rule. This balancing test
weighs the harm to the defendant of being forced to prosecute stale
claims against the harm to a plaintiff of being deprived of a rem-
has not previously been reported to a law enforcement agency or prosecuting attor-
ney, and the period prescribed in subsection (b) has not expired since the victim has
reached the age of eighteen (18): ... (8) Sexual abuse in the fist degree as prohib-
ited in § 5-14-108.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.15(7) (West 1976 & Supp. 1989) states, "If the victim of a viola-
tion of... [sex offenses listed] ... is under the age of sixteen, the applicable period of
limitations, if any, does not begin to run until the victim has reached the age of sixteen
."; Mass. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 277, § 63 (1980 & Supp. 1988) states:
Nothwithstanding the foregoing provisions, if a victim of a crime set forth in...
[includes sex offenses] ... is under the age of sixteen at the time such crime is
committed, the period of limitations for prosecution shall not commence until the
victim has reached the age of sixteen or the violation is reported to a law enforce-
ment agency, whichever occurs earlier.
50 See Comment, Adult Incest Survivors and the Statute of Limitations: The Delayed Discovery
Rule and Long-Term Damages, 25 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 191 (1985) (The discovery rule
permits tolling of the statue of limitations until all the elements of the crime have been
discovered. The comment argues that the application of the delayed discovery excep-
tion is appropriate for damages suffered by adult incest survivors.).
51 E.W. v. D.C.H., 754 P.2d 817, 819 (Mont. 1988) (The court refused to apply the
discovery rule to extend the statutory limitation period in a civil action to recover dam-
ages for emotional distress resulting from sexual abuse committed against the plaintiff
as a child.).
52 Note, Evidence: Discovery Rule Application in Child Abuse Actions, 23 GONZ. L. REv.
223, 226 (1987/88).
53 Id. at 224-225.
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edy.5 4 Therefore, the discovery rule "should be adopted only when
the risk of stale claims is outweighed by the unfairness of precluding
justified causes of action." 55
Attempts to apply the discovery rule to toll the statute of limita-
tions for sexual offenses committed against children have been
made by plaintiffs in civil actions seeking to recover damages for
emotional distress. 56 In the landmark case of Tyson v. Tyson, 57 the
issue presented to the court was whether the discovery rule should
be applied to toll the statute of limitations until the plaintiff discov-
ers the cause of action, where the victim had blocked the illicit inci-
dents from her conscious memory for a period extending beyond
the duration of the limitation period. 58
The court, in addressing its concern about the evidentiary
problems surrounding stale claims, examined other fact scenerios in
which the discovery rule had been applied, such as medical malprac-
tice, products liability, and asbestos cases, and found that in each
instance there was "objective, verifiable evidence" of the wrongful
conduct.59 The court determined that existence of this evidence di-
minished the risk of stale evidence by increasing the possibility that
the fact finder would be able to determine the truth despite the pas-
sage of time.60 However, due to the absence of such objective evi-
dence of the allegations, the Tyson court refused to apply the
discovery rule.61 Since Tyson, the existence of objective, verifiable
evidence as a prerequisite to application of the discovery rule has
54 See Glimcher, Statute of Limitations and the Discovery Rule in Latent Injury Claims: An
Exception or the Law, 43 U. PiTt. L. REV. 501 (1982).
55 Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash.2d 72, 76, 727 P.2d 226, 228 (1986) (citing United
States Oil & Refinery Co. v. Dep't. of Ecology, 96 Wash.2d 85, 93, 633 P.2d 1329, 1334
(1981)).
56 See, e.g., Tyson, 107 Wash.2d at 72, 727 P.2d at 226; John R. v. Oakland Unified
School Dist., 206 Cal. App. 3d 1473, 240 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1987); E.W. v. D.C.H., 754
P.2d 817 (Mont. 1988); DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368
(1987).
57 107 Wash.2d at 72, 727 P.2d at 206.
58 Id. at 73-74, 727 P.2d at 227. The plaintiff-victim was subject to multiple acts of
sexual assault during her childhood from 1960 through 1969 but failed to file a com-
plaint until 1983. The cause for the delay was the suppression of the alleged acts by the
victim, which resurfaced only through psychological therapy undertaken several years
later in 1983. Id. at 74, 727 P.2d at 227.
59 Id. at 76, 727 P.2d at 228.
60 "Because of the availability and trustworthiness of objective, verifiable evidence in
the above cases, the claims were neither speculative nor incapable of proof. Since the
evidentiary problems which the statute of limitations is designed to prevent did not exist
or were reduced, it was reasonable to extend the period for bringing the actions." Id. at
77, 727 P.2d at 228.
61 Id. at 77, 80, 727 P.2d at 229, 230.
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been followed by several courts in other jurisdictions. 62
Nevertheless, the five-four decision in Tyson is not without con-
troversy. Many critics, supporting the views expressed in the dis-
sent,63 suggest that the need for objective, verifiable evidence
ignores the balancing of interests test. At the very least, the balanc-
ing of interests test essentially becomes biased towards the accused
when objective, verifiable evidence is required.64 Furthermore,
many of the courts following the Tyson decision have noted that the
application of the discovery rule to a particular offense is the prov-
ince of the legislatures and not the courts. 65 Other courts have sug-
gested that legislatures should give special attention to the
applicability of the discovery rule for cases involving the sexual
abuse of children.
66
In response to the courts, the state legislatures of Alaska,
Oklahoma, and Utah 67 have recognized the applicability of the dis-
covery rule to child sexual abuse offenses. For example, in Utah the
statutory limitation provision provides that if the four-year period
has expired, "a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for...
(c) sexual abuse of a child within one year after the report of offense
to law enforcement officials, so long as no more than eight years has
elapsed since the alleged commission of the offense."
68
62 See John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 206 Cal. App. 3d 1473, 240 Cal. Rptr.
319 (1987); DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987); E.W.
v. D.C.H., 754 P.2d 817 (Mont. 1988).
63 See, e.g., Note, supra note 52, at 229-34.
64 "Fundalmental fairness, not availability of objective evidence, has always been the
linchpin of the discovery rule." Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 82, 727 P.2d at 231 (Pearson, J.,
dissenting). The dissent suggested that the issue was simply to decide "whether notions
of fundamental fairness entitle the plaintiff to try to convince a court or jury that she
discovered or should have discovered her cause of action after it would otherwise have
been foreclosed by the statute of limitations." Id. at 231 (Pearson, J., dissenting). Ac-
cording to the dissent, the evidentiary problems encountered by the plaintiff in trying to
convince the trier of fact of the reasonableness of her late discovery should not be the
court's concern. Id. at 231 (Pearson, J., dissenting).
65 See, e.g., id. at 80, 727 P.2d at 230 (5-4 decision) (Goodloe, J., concurring) (con-
cluded that it was a policy decision that should be determined by the legislature).
66 See, e.g., E. W. v. D.C.H. 754 P.2d at 821. "While this Court is aware of the horrify-
ing damage inflicted by child molesters, it is not for us to rewrite the statute of limita-
tions to accomodate such claims through judicial fiat. Such a task is properly vested in
the legislature."
67 See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
68 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-303 (1978 & Supp. 1989). See also ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.10.020 (1962 & Supp. 1988), which states in pertinent part:
Specific Time Limitations ... (c) Even if the general time limitation has expired, a
prosecution under Alaska statutes § 11.41.410 - 11.41.460 [sexual offenses] for an
offense committed against a person under the age of sixteen may be commenced
within one year after the crime is reported to a peace officer or the person reaches
the age of sixteen, whichever occurs first. This subsection does not extend the pe-
riod of limitation by more than five years.
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Similarly, Georgia statutorily provides for the application of the
discovery rule for general offenses.69 However, courts in Georgia
have denied tolling the statutory period for child sexual abuse of-
fenses by imputing the victim's knowledge of the acts to knowledge
of the state. In Sears v. State,70 for example, the victim testified that
she knew of the sexual acts wrongfully committed against her when
she was eleven years old, but she was not specifically aware that such
conduct was criminal. She only became aware of the criminality of
the conduct four years later as the result of radio and television
news broadcasts. 71 The court held:
Where, as here the undisputed record evidence shows that the victim
had knowledge of the offenses (if not their criminality) allegedly com-
mitted upon her by the appellant 'in the year 1980,' such knowledge is
imputed to the State, and precludes the State from obtaining an indict-
ment against appellant for those alleged crimes more than four years
after both the offenses and the offender were known.72
Georgia, however, as a discovery rule state, stands alone on this
view.
Several state legislatures have qualified the application of the
discovery rule by requiring that there be either a breach of a fiduci-
ary relationship or concealment of the crime by the accused. 73
b. Breach of Fiduciary Obligation
A common circumstance under which several states permit toll-
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 152 (1978 & Supp. 1989) states, "Limitations in General...
the crime of lewd or indecent proposals or acts against children, pursuant to § 1123 of
Title 21 of the Oklahoma statutes, [lists other child sexual abuse offenses and other
offenses] shall be commenced within five years after the discovery of the crime."
69 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-503 (Harrison 1988) states, "The period within which a pros-
ecution must be commenced under Code Section 17-3-1 ... does not include any period
in which: . . . (2) The person committing the crime is unknown or the crime is un-
known ......
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-69 (1976) provided that where the alleged victim was
under 16 years old, the offense must be brought within one year after a parent, guard-
ian, or other competent person especially interested in the alleged victim learns of the
offense. However, this section was repealed in 1987. The current applicable provision,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-193(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1989) provides a one year stat-
utory period of limitations.
70 182 Ga. App. 480, 356 S.E.2d 72 (1987).
71 Id. at 481, 356 S.E.2d at 74.
72 Id. see also People v. Strait, 152 Ill. App. 3d 599, 367 N.E.2d 768 (1977). Charges
of indecent liberties with a child were dismissed because prosecution of the offense was
barred by the staute of limitations. Here again, the court held that the crime was easily
discoverable because the victim had knowledge. The court further stated that because
the victim did not immediately report the incident to the authorities, the statutory dis-
covery rule exception would not operate to extend the period of limitations. Id. at 602,
367 N.E.2d at 771.
73 See infra notes 74-101 and accompanying text.
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ing the statute of limitations until discovery of the offense is made is
when a breach of a fiduciary obligation or relationship occurs. For
instance, Delaware's limitation provision provides:
If the period ... has expired, a prosecution for any offense in
which the accused's acts include or constitute ... breach of fiduciary
duty ... may be commenced within two years after discovery of the
offense has been made or should have been made in the exercise of
ordinary diligence by an aggrieved party or by an authorized agent,
fiduciary guardian, personal representative or parent.., who is not a
party to the offense. In no case shall this provision extend the period
of limitation otherwise applicable by more than an additional three
years beyond the period specified in subsection (b) of this section.
74
Such an exception may arguably be applied to sexual offenses
committed against children. The existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship between the accused and the child imposes an affirmative obli-
gation upon the dominating party to make full disclosure. The
failure to disclose is treated as fraudulent concealment of the cause
of action by the defendant, even though no active misrepresentation
is ever made.
75
In Illinois, the legislature has specifically applied this discovery
exception to sexual offenses:
A prosecution for any offense involving sexual conduct or sexual
penetration, as defined in § 12-12 of this Code, where defendant was
within a professional or fiduciary relationship with the victim at the
time of the commission of the offense may be commenced within one
year after discovery of the offense by the victim.
76
However, in many of the other states, breach of the fiduciary
obligation must be a "material element of the offense" before the
limitation period may be tolled.77 In State v. Mills,78 the court de-
74 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 205(c) (1987). HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-108(3)(a) (1985 &
Supp. 1988) states:
If the period... has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for:
(a) Any offense an element of which is either fraud or a breach of a fiduciary obliga-
tion within two years after discovery of the offense by a person who has a legal duty
to represent an aggrieved party, and who is himself not a party to the offense.
ME: REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 8(5)(a) (1978) states, "If the period of limitation has
expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for: (a) Any crime based upon
breach of fiduciary obligation, within one year after discovery of the crime by an ag-
grevied party .... "
75 See Comment, supra note 50, at 204.
76 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 3-6(e) (Smith-Hurd 1989).
77 HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-108(3)(a) (1985 & Supp. 1988) states:
If the period... has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for:
(a) Any offense an element of which is either fraud or breach of a fiduciary obliga-
tion within two years after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or by a
person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is himself not
a party to the offense ... but in no case shall this provision extend the period of
limitation otherwise applicable by more than six years.
COMMENT
fined material elements as "[t]hose constituent parts of a crime
which must be proved by the prosecution to sustain a convic-
tion.' -79 In Mills, the state argued that the deviate sexual in-
tercouse of defendant upon his daughter, a person under the age of
sixteen years, constituted a breach of the fiduciary obligation that a
father owes to his daughter.80 The court, however, held that the
breach of a fiduciary obligation is not a material element of the of-
fense; thus, the exception to toll the statutory period is not applica-
ble.81 According to the statutory language, the offense of sodomy
only requires that the victim be a close family relation of the defend-
ant.8 2 There is no explicit requirement to prove breach of a fiduci-
ary obligation in order to obtain a conviction.8 3 Further, the Mills
court stated that if the legislature desired to extend the limitation
period for crimes involving sexual abuse of minors, it would have
done so in a clear and straightforward manner.8 4
c. Concealment
Concealment of a crime is a another recognized cause for toll-
ing the statute of limitations until discovery is made. In State v.
Danielski,85 a Minnesota court utilized the doctrine of concealment
as a means to toll the running of the statutory period in order to
overcome certain injustices in child sexual abuse cases. Prosecution
for child sexual abuse under Minnesota statute requires that the de-
fendant both be in a position of authority over the victim and use
that authority to coerce the victim to submit to the acts.8 6 The Min-
OR. REV. STAT. § 131.125(3)(a) (1987) states:
If the offense has as a material element either fraud or the breach of a fiduciary
obligation, prosecution may be commenced within one year after discovery of the
offense by the aggrieved party ...but in no case shall the period of limitation
otherwise applicable be extended by more than three years.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5552(c)(1) (Purdon 1981) states, "If the period prescribed...
has expired, a prosecution may neverthless be commenced for: (1) Any offense a mate-
rial element of which is either fraud or breach of fiduciary obligation within one year
after discovery of the offense ...."
78 77 Or. App. 125, 711 P.2d 207 (1985).
79 Id. at 129, 711 P.2d at 209 (quoting BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 467 (5th ed. 1979)).
80 Id. at 128-29, 711 P.2d at 208.
81 Id. at 129, 711 P.2d at 209.
82 Id. at 128, 711 P.2d at 208.
83 Id.; accord, Commonwealth v. Goldhammer, 507 Pa. 236, 241-42, 489 A.2d 1307,
1311-12 (1985) (The court held that for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations, the
definition of the offense must include fraud or breach of fiduciary obligation as one of its
elements. Theft by unlawful taking does not contain as a material element either fraud
or breach of fiduciary obligation.).
84 Mills, 77 Or. App. at 130, 711 P.2d. at 209.
85 348 N.W.2d 352 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
86 MINN. STAT. § 609.342(b) (1980).
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nesota court held that commission of the offense is continuing as
long as the accused abuses his or her position of authority and thus
the statutory period of limitation does not commence until the coer-
cion ceases.8
7
The court's application of the concealment exception is justi-
fied under the doctrine of continuing offenses. The Supreme Court
has held that the "[s]tatute of limitations normally begins to run
when the crime is complete.' "88 A crime is said to be complete
upon the satisfaction of all of the elements of the offense. 89 How-
ever, under the doctrine of continuing offenses, even though all the
elements of the crime have occured, if one of the elements persists,
the crime is not complete but is a continuing offense. 90
In child sexual abuse cases, although each act of penetration
may constitute a separate offense, as long as the same authority
"that is used to accomplish criminal sexual acts against a child is
used to prevent the reporting of that act," the offense is continuous
and "the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the child
is no longer subjected to that authority." 91
Furthermore, the concealment of a crime which suspends the
operation of the statute of limitations must be the result of positive
acts done by the accused, calculated to prevent the discovery of the
commission of the offense. 92 Mere silence, inaction, or nondisclo-
87 Danielski, 348 N.W.2d at 357.
88 Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115 (1970) (quoting Pendergast v. United
States, 317 U.S. 412, 418 (1943)) (Court acknowledged that whether a particular crimi-
nal offense is a continuing offense is a question of statutory interpretation).
89 See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 12.10.030 (1984) (statutory period starts running when
every element of the offense occurs or the prohibited conduct is terminated).
90 Note, supra note 19, at 642.
91 Danieiski, 348 N.W.2d at 356. The court found that the offense was a continuing
one because the defendant who was in a position of authority over the victim used that
authority, by means of threats, to coerce the victim to submit to the sexual acts. The
defendant's conduct and use of authority was found sufficient to toll the statutes of limi-
tations until the child was no longer subjected to such authority. Id. at 357; see also State
v.Johnson, 422 N.W.2d 14, 17-18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (The court, in following Daniel-
ski, affirmed the trial court's determination that the defendant actively coerced his victim
by threatening to throw her into jail along with threats of other physical abuse. The
court also noted that the lapse of time after the statute had run was irrelevant. But see
State v. Bentley, 239 Kan. 334, 339, 721 P.2d 227, 230 (1986). (an uncle's threat to
repeat the act if his nine year old niece revealed the sexual incidents did not constitute
concealment and thus did not toll the statute of limitations).
92 State v. Mills, 238 Kan. 189, 190, 707 P.2d 1079, 1081 (1985). (threats issued by a
third party not to reveal incidents of fondling did not constitute concealment to toll the
running of the statute of limitations); State v. Shamp, 422 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. App.
1988) (the court held that where the accused, here the victim's sister, did not control the
victim's day to day movements and did not reside with the victim, the statute of limita-
tions is not tolled).
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sure alone does not constitute concealmeant. 93
Many courts have rejected the concealment exception, claiming
that "it is not the province of the court to fashion exceptions to the
statute of limitations as that task is left to the legislature." 94 How-
ever, a few state legislatures, recognizing that many child sexual
abuse acts are in fact concealed by the abuser, have enacted legisla-
tion to counter this result. The Louisiana concealment exception to
the four-year statutory limitation period for child sexual abuse of-
fenses reads as follows:
The time limitations established by Article 572 shall not com-
mence to run as to the following offenses until the relationship or sta-
tus involved has ceased to exist where:...
(4) The offense charged is one of the following... indecent be-
havior with juveniles (R.S. 14:81) ... and the victim is under the domi-
nation or control of the offender while under seventeen years of age. 95
Emphasis is placed upon the existence of control. 96 Thus the limita-
tion period is tolled only until the coercion or domination ceases.
In Nevada,97 Indiana,98 and Kansas,99 general provisions for
concealment exceptions have been enacted. Although these provi-
sions are not explicitly applicable to cases regarding child sexual
abuse, the courts in Nevada 00 and Indiana' 0 have applied the gen-
93 Id.
94 Id. at 191, 707 P.2d at 1081; Bentley, 239 Kan. at 339, 721 P.2d at 230.
95 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 573 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
96 State v. Barre, 532 So. 2d 842, 843 (La. Ct. App. 1988). Application of the Louisi-
ana statutory exception "requires a showing of a relationship or status and proof of
'domination or control' by the offender over his victim while the victim is under the age
of seventeen." Here the court held that the record failed to support a finding that the
victim was under the domination of her father, the defendant. The victim stated that she
was never forced to visit her father and would often call him and arrange to see him even
after the alleged offense. She also testified that she did not fear physical harm from her
father if she revealed his behavior.
97 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.095(1) (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1988) ("If a felony.., is
committed in a secret manner ... an information [must be] filed [within three or four
years] after the discovery of the offense.").
98 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-4-21(d) (West 1986) states:
The period within which a prosecution must be commenced does not include any
period in which: . .. (2) the accused person conceals evidence of the offense, and
evidence sufficient to charge him with that offense is unknown to the prosecuting
authority and could not have been discovered by that authority by exercise of due
diligence.
99 KAN. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 21-3106(4)(c) (Vernon 1988) ("The period within
which a prosecution must be commenced shall not include any period in which... (c)
the fact of the crime is concealed; ....").
100 See, e.g., Walstrom v. State, 752 P.2d 225, 228 (Nev. 1988):
We conclude that a crime is done in a secret manner, under NRS 171.095, when it is
committed in a deliberately surreptitious manner that is intended to and does keep
all but those committing the crime unaware that an offense has been committed...
given the inherently vulnerable nature of a child, we conclude that the crime of
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eral statutory exception to child sexual abuse offenses. However,
the courts in Kansas have consistently held that their statutory con-
cealment exception does not apply to child sexual offenses. In State
v. Bentley, 10 2 the Kansas Supreme Court held that "[c]rimes against
persons, by their very nature, cannot be concealed."' 03 The court
concluded that threats by an uncle to repeat the offensive acts if the
nine year old victim revealed the incidents to anyone did not
amount to concealment of a crime. 10 4 However, the court noted
that the uncle's ability to control the child victim in this case was too
remote.105
E. AMENDMENT TO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In recent years many state legislatures have amended their leg-
islation for offenses committed against minors by extending the ap-
plicable limitation period. 10 6  The constitutionality of these
amendments have been upheld. 0 7
In absence of language to the contrary, these extended periods
lewdness with a minor can be committed in a secret manner, even though a victim is
involved.
101 See, e.g., Crider v. State, 351 N.E.2d 1151, 1154 (Ind. 1988). Defendant who was
convicted of child molesting threatened his daughter with bodily harm if she revealed
the acts. The court held that the defendant concealed the fact of his crime by her posi-
tive acts of intimidation of his victim. The statute of limitations did not run until the
victim made her disclosure to authorities.
102 239 Kan. 334, 721 P.2d 227 (1986).
103 Id. at 339, 721 P.2d at 230.
104 Id.; accord State v. Miller, 11 Kan. App.2d 410,413-14, 722 P.2d 1131, 1134 (1986)
(threats by defendant to step-daughters that he would hurt them if they told anyone
about the alleged aggravated incest did not constitute concealment).
105 State v. Bentley, 239 Kan. 334, 339, 721 P.2d 227, 230 (1986).
106 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-3-5(a)(4) (1975) (extended the general provision of three
years to a no limitation pdriod in 1985); ALASKA STAT. § 12.10.020 (1984) (in 1983 ex-
tended a five year period to a one year period after the child reaches 16 or after the
crime is reported to a peace officer, whichever occurs first); ARK. STAT. ANN § 5-1-109(h)
(1987) (in 1987 added an exception to the three year limitation period in which prosecu-
tion may be commenced within three years of the victim attaining the age of 18, where
the offense was committed against a minor and the violation had not been previously
reported to a law enforcement agency); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.15 (1976 & Supp. 1989)
(in 1984 added that if the victim is under the age of 16, the period of limitations does
not begin to run until the victim has reached the age of sixteen or the violation is re-
ported to a law enforcement agency, whichever occurs first); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.040.080(1)(c) (in 1985 extended the period in which prosecution may be com-
menced for crimes of indecent liberties from five to seven years).
107 The Seventh Circuit, in upholding the constitutionality of these amendments, ex-
plicitly held that the extension of a statute of limitations was merely a procedural altera-
tion which did "not increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense
or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt.' " United States ix rel. Massarella v.




apply not only to crimes committed subsequent to the date the stat-
ute was amended, but encompass those offenses not barred by the
previous legislative period. 108 However, where the statute explicitly
states that the provision of this section (or act) does not apply to any
offense committed before the effective date of the section, the limi-
tation period only operates prospectively.
10 9
III. LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATION
A period of limitation should be determined by the legislative
goals and purposes underlying statutes of limitations. The main
purpose of any statute of limitations is "to protect the accused from
the burden of defending himself against charges of long completed
misconduct."110 Likewise, criminal prosecution should be based on
evidence that is reasonably fresh and trustworthy."' To allow
otherwise would infringe upon the accused's rights to a fair trial due
108 See State v. Creekpaum, 753 P.2d 1139 (Alaska 1988) (Defendant who allegedly
sexually assaulted a nine year old girl filed a motion to dismiss the case on the grounds
that the applicable statute of limitations had run. The court held that the extension of
the statute of limitations before the original limitation period had run on defendant's
alleged offense was not an unconstitutional ex post facto law.); People v. Callan, 174
Cal. App. 3d 1011, 220 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1985) (statutory amendments lengthening the
statute of limitations for bringing prosecution to six years for lewd and lascivious con-
duct with a child under the age of 14 years was not time barred where statutory
amendents were enacted before the old statutory period expired); People v. Whitesell,
729 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986) (Defendant was charged with sexual criminal assault on a
child. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the amendment increasing the applicable
statute of limitations for an additional three years applied to all offenses not time barred
as of the amendment's effective date.).
The court in Commonwealth v. Thek, 376 Pa. Super. 390, 401, 546 A.2d 83, 89
(1988) stated:
Where the legislature amends a statute of limitations to provide a longer limitations
period or enacts [an amendment] which tolls the running of the statute of limita-
tions before prior limitations period has expired, in the absence of language in the
statute to the contrary, the amendments will be construed to apply so as to extend
the period within which prosecution is to be commenced.
However, an amendment would be in violation of the state constitution's ex post facto
clause if it extends the statute of limitations to resurrect a case for which the statury
period has already run. Id. at 401, 546 A.2d at 89.
The court in State v Traczyk, 421 N.W.2d 229 (Minn. 1988), however, held that the
amended statute of limitations is not to be applied retroactively to any offense commit-
ted prior to the effective amendment date.
109 See Martin v. Superior Court, 135 Ariz. 99, 100, 659 P.2d 652, 653 (1983). The
language specifying the applicability of the act was not explicit in the statute of limita-
tions provision but in another section of the act. Nevertheless, the court held that all
provisions of the new criminal code applied prospectively and not retroactively. Thus,
the court dismissed the indictment on the grounds that the old applicable statutory pe-
riod had expired.
110 Note, supra note 19, at 632.
Ill Id.
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to evidentiary problems of obtaining witnesses,"12 forgotten
events, 13 and lost records.' 14 This general goal of a statute of limi-
tations is further supplemented by a defendant's constitutional right
to a speedy trial."15
Generally, to determine the length of a statute of limitations,
state legislatures weigh factors supporting a shorter period of limi-
tation against factors justifying a longer limitation period. Factors
which justify a short period of limitation are staleness of evidence,
motivation, and repose. A short period of limitation overcomes
many of the problems associated with stale evidence.' 16 A brief lim-
itation period also motivates the state to be efficient in prosecuting
criminal offenses."17 Furthermore, a shorter period of limitation
fosters rehabilitation by assuring a criminal that any rehabilitative
progress will not be shattered by the enforcement of some long-
dormant claim." 18
Factors which support a long period of limitation are conceal-
ment, investigation, and the seriousness of the offense." 19 The very
nature of certain crimes, particularly child sexual abuse, makes de-
tection of the offense especially difficult. A long period of limitation
112 Id. (As time lapses, witnesses may be difficult to locate because they might have
moved or passed away.).
113 Id. (As memories fade, testimonies become less reliable.). But see Uelmen, supra
note 34, at 46 ("Some research suggests that passage of time assumes less significance as
more time passes, since loss of memory is most accute in the period immediately follow-
ing the events while long term memory is more of a gradual process.").
114 See Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash.2d 72,75-76, 727 P.2d 226, 228 (1986) (Physical
evidence is more likely to be lost when a claim is stale either because it has been mis-
placed or because its significance was not comprehended at the time of the alleged
wrong.).
115 Note, supra note 19, at 633 (Statutes of limitations provide no assurance as to the
time of the trial. A limitation period only assures that an indictment will be issued within
a specified time.).
116 See Uelman, supra note 34, at 46-47.
117 See Uelmen, supra note 34, at 48-49 (This is to insure against bureacratic delays.
However, the author also suggests that the statute of limitations may be a negligible
factor in motivating, as priority in investing and prosecuting is determined by other
means such as the seriousness of the offense.).
118 Note, supra note 19, at 634. (Society will have more to lose than to gain in prose-
cuting a criminal unlikely to commit another crime. Desirable to bar prosecution where
there is a strong possibility that self rehabilitation has taken place.) Id. at 638. Uelman,
supra note 34, at 51 (quoting Model Penal Code § 1.07 at 16) states:
If the person refrains from further criminal activity, the likelihood increases with the
passage of time that he has reformed, diminishing pro tanto the necessity for impo-
sition of the criminal sanction. If he has repeated his criminal behavior, he can be
prosecuted for recent offenses committed within the period of limitations. As time
goes by, the retributive impulse which may have existed in the community is likely
to yield place to a sense of compassion for the person prosecuted for an offense
long forgotten.'
119 Uelmen, supra note 34, at 52.
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insures that a perpetrator does not escape punishment simply by
successfully concealing his acts. Besides, concealed crimes gener-
ally require a longer period of investigation and thus justify a longer
limitation period. 1 20 Generally, the seriousness of the offense corre-
lates with the duration of a limitation period regardless of whether
the purpose of criminal law is deterrence, incapacitation, or
rehabilitation. 121
The extent to which current states' statute of limitations for
child sexual abuse offenses reflect and satisfy these purposes and
factors merits discussion.
Statutes of limitations which permit commencement of prosecu-
tion up until a specified number of years after the commission of the
offense are inflexible and ineffective. Such an approach is advanta-
geous only to the extent that it is expedient and cost efficient in
determining whether a certain case may or may not be prose-
cuted.1 22 However, to screen worthy causes of action at the plead-
ing stage rather than through the trier of fact would be an
"elevation of procedural efficiency over substantive justice."'123
States adopting this approach have failed to consider the spe-
cial circumstances that arise in child sexual abuse cases. In many
instances, for example, report of the abuse is delayed because of
coercion employed by the accused. 124 This coercion generally re-
sults in the child becoming confused and guilt-ridden.' 25 An incest
victim may also fear losing the affection of those from whom he or
she is accustomed of regularly seeking comfort.' 26 Furthermore,
the mystique surrounding sex often catises the child to fear that he
or she will not be believed or is somehow personally responsible for
the sexual incident(s). 27 Finally, because of his or her youth and
ignorance, a child may not fully comprehend the criminal nature of
120 Id. There is an obvious correlation between crimes that require a lengthy investi-
gation and those associated with concealment. Id. at 55. In a survey to identify the
crimes most likely to be concealed, child molesting was ranked seventh out of 26 crimes.
Id. at 53. However, the author suggests that the concealment factor can be accomodated
by suspending the limitation period until discovery. Id. at 54.
121 Id. at 56. (Generally the more serious the offense, the longer the period of
limitation.).
122 Comment, Accural of Statutes of Limitations: California's Discovery Exceptions Swallow the
Rule, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 106, 118 (1988).
123 Id.; see also Note, supra note 52, at 228.
124 See HIGHLIGHTS OF OFFICIAL CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING (1985) [here-
inafter HIGHLIGHTS].
125 See Comment, Civil Claims of Adults Molested as Children: Maturation of Harm and the





the defendant's behavior. 28
States which have recognized the need for special consideration
for offenses committed against children have enacted statutes of
limitations which extend or toll the limitation period until the victim
attains the age of majority or soon thereafter.' 29 This approach at-
tempts to remedy the inequity associated with the inability of minors
to commence prosecution on their own behalf or to inform the state
of the criminally committed acts due to coercion, dependence, or
ignorance. 130
However, even this approach is inflexible and fails to serve sat-
isfactorily the purposes underlying the statute of limitations. Under
such a statute of limitations, there is a possibility that a prosecutor
might obtain sufficient evidence against the accused soon after the
crime is committed but waits until a time just before the victim at-
tains majority to commence prosecution. Such strategizing may
prevent a defendant from effectively and equitably establishing a de-
fense, and will undermine many of the purposes of the statute of
limitations.' 3 '
Many of the problems associated with the above two methods
could be overcome by providing exceptions to toll the running of
the statutory provision. 32 By means of exceptions, particular cir-
cumstances that may arise can be accommodated without sacrificing
the purposes and factors of the statute of limitations.
The discovery approach-tolling the statute of limitations until
discovery of the offense has been made-is superior to the fixed
time approach of the prior two methods. Discovery of the offense is
said to occur when a third person, who is not a party to the offense,
becomes aware of the offense.' 3 3 The fact that the victim may real-
128 See Comment, The Young Victim as Witness for'the Prosectuion: Another Form ofAbuse? 89
DICK. L. REV. 721, 731 (1985). According to a study conducted by the Amercian Hu-
mane Society and the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect approximately
28.5% of child sexual victims are under the age of five and therefore do not realise the
wrongfulness of the sexual act. HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 124, at 19.
129 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
130 The preamble to the 1987 amendment of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-109 (1978) states,
"[Whereas, in many instances, child victims are threatened or intimidated to prevent
the prompt reporting of abuse or sexual offenses; and whereas, it is in the best interest
of the State to extend the statute of limitations for certain offenses involving child vic-
tims; now therefore ......
131 Note, supra note 19, at 639.
132 Uelman, supra note 34, at 63.
133 SeeJohn R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 206 Cal. App. 3d 1473, 240 Cal. Rptr.
319 (1987). The court determined that the statutory period commenced from the date
of the parents' discovery even though the child was aware of the criminal act because
under those circumstances the timeliness of the action for sexual assault depended upon
the knowledge of someone other than the plaintiff-victim.
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ize that the conduct is of a criminal nature prior to discovery by a
third party should not be determinative for statute of limitations
purposes because the victim may not report such conduct due to
coercion, self-blame, or fear of destroying the family.
Suspension of the statute of limitations until discovery of the
offense where the crime is concealed should be preferred over a
longer limitation period. 134 Under this approach, the accused is ar-
guably no more prejudiced in his or her attempt to gather evidence
than would be the victim.' 3 5 Futhermore, the desire for motivation
is satisfied by limiting the prosecution period following discovery.
The state would be able to prosecute only to the point of discovery
plus a reasonable time thereafter to properly investigate. 136
However, under the present statutory discovery rule approach,
the interests of the accused are not fairly considered. The state's
interest in prosecution unjustly takes automatic precedent over the
interests of the defendant.
Historically, courts have employed a balancing of interests test
to determine the applicability of the discovery rule to toll a statute
of limitations. 37 A balancing test enables a court to avoid sacrific-
ing one factor of a limitation period to accommodate another factor.
To accommodate both the circumstances that may arise in child sex-
ual abuse cases as well as the purposes of a statute of limitations,
focus must be on the reasons for delay. 138 Therefore, the following
provision should be utilized:
No person shall be prosecuted, tried or punishedfor the offense of child sexual
abuse unless an indictment is issued or information is filed within x years after the
commission of the offense.
If the above period has expired, a court has discretion to toll the limitation
period until one year after discovery of the offense has been made by a law enforce-
ment agency or any other person who is not a party to the offense.
Factors to be taken into consideration and balanced by the court to
determine whether to apply the discovery rule exception should
include:
1) the time elapsed since the offense was committed;
2) whether the victim and the state acted reasonably or in good faith in
making the discovery;
134 Uelman, supra note 34, at 51.
135 The state is unaware of the offense until informed by the victim or a third party.
Furthermore, unlike a manufacturer who does not know that an injury has occured, a
sexual abuse offender is completely aware of the abuse. See DeRose, Adult Incest Survivors
and the Statute of Limitations: The Delayed Discovery Rule and Long-Term Damages, 25 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 191, 222 (1985).
136 See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
137 See supra note 54-55 and accompanying text.
138 Note, Supra note 52, at 233.
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3) whether the victim, under the circumstances, was diligent in informing a
third party and that any delay in so doing was done in good faith;
4) whether timely notice was given to the defendants when the offense was
discovered;
5) whether there was a rational basis for the delay in discovery;
6) the extent the defendant will suffer prudice, if at all, in his right to
gather evidence if discovery accrual is allowed;
7) whether there was a fiduciary relationship involved;
8) whether coercion was employed; and
9) the grievousness of the act. 139
IV. CONCLUSION
In the midst of statutory reform efforts to improve the handling
of child sexual abuse cases in the legal system, legislative attention
must be given to the statute of limitations. Courts troubled by the
injustice that have arisen due to the inflexible nature of present stat-
utes of limitations have looked to the legislatures for relief. 40 By
adopting the proposed legislation, relief can accommodate both the
purposes of a statute of limitations as well as the circumstances com-
mon in child sexual abuse cases.
DURGA M. BHARAM
139 See Comment, supra note 50, at 220-21; Note, supra note 19, at 638-39.
140 See Supra notes 66, 84 and 94 and accompanying text.
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